Oil, Gas, Energy Scrapbook: Amidst a “media war” a debate on local content

Captured in the rear view mirror of the present problems independent media is facing is the delicate moment that Uganda’s oil industry is at.

A midstream bill is due for assent before the President even as word waxing in suggests that some announcement on a memorandum ( an agreement) on production is eminent after weeks of negotiations between the government and the joint venture partners ( CNOOC, Total and Tullow).

In Kampala starting tomorrow will commence another extractives sector conference on both petroleum and mining- that is likely to get cursory treatment only given the subject matter and the atrophying of the “other media”.

The temporary dearth of news on the extractives is bad enough. Since transparency is essential to the extractives sector overall as perhaps the most significant technology to guarantee fair outcomes a random media shut down sends the worst signal for what could happen down the road.

imagesOne of the debates of the last month spearheaded by an association of oil sector service providers, a private sector lobby for “local content” was on the so-called 48% provision in the upstream bill under article 125

” 125. Provision of goods and services by Uganda entrepreneurs.

(1) The licensee, its contractors and subcontractors shall give preference to goods which are produced or available in Uganda and services which are rendered by Ugandan citizens and companies.

Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Act 3 Production) Act 2013

(2) Where the goods and services required by the contactor or licensee are not available in Uganda, they shall be provided by a company which has entered into a joint venture with a Ugandan company provided that the Ugandan company has a share capital of at least forty eight percent in the joint venture”.

There has been some debate on whether the 48% required was realistic. Some of the interpretation has been literal. Tullow’s Uganda boss, Elly Karuhanga is quoted here as saying “ “Tullow is a twenty billion dollarcompany so if you say 48 % of Tullow must be owned by Ugandans, are you saying that Ugandans bring 10 billion dollars and Tullow shareholders should sell to Ugandans by force, by law? Is that realistic?”

THE BILL Petroleum (EDP) Act 2013

Well here are my two cents.

It is unclear ( at least to me) how the 48 per cent was arrived at. Some countries have higher or lower percentiles for local participation.

However 48 per cent is almost half of the business; slightly under 50 per cent. The logic of this provision is that Ugandans are entitled to half of the opportunities for providing services within the oil sector over the long run.

This provision infers both equity and equality in regards to Ugandan ownership. Equity in the sense that the oil is inherently a Ugandan national asset to which all citizens are co-owners. So even if the asset is commercialized with foreign investment 48% stands for the domestic ownership of the asset. It jives with the goal of indigenization of the sector through commercializing with a refinery from the get-go.

Equality  as a goal is more problematic and political.

While the law has prescribed 48%, access to the business for Ugandans is likely skewed to those who have money to invest.

Uganda’s private sector is largely a state-based class that thrives on a system of political patronage.  It started in 1990s when the Government undertook a policy of neo-liberal reforms that included liberalization, privatization and decentralization. Many who acquired government assets were politically connected while foreign firms that partook of the liberalization of the economy were over-represented by Asian run businesses. Decades later it is this class, the state-based business elites that stand to gobble the 48% indigenization clauses in the upstream bill. Its also a class with access to political power.

Indeed no thorough review of privatization has been conducted and the only report of the Ministry responsible for it has been unofficially sealed.

This presents a potentially difficult situation since the nature of Ugandan politics today suggests that state patronage and corruption are both ethnic-ized. While balanced through official appointments the impression within the public debate is still that the political question most pressing, certainly in the oil sector, is “sharing of the national cake”.

To avoid a backlash that view that a few connected individuals, families or ethnic groups with a so-called “advantage” over the rest are benefitting more the best path is to “democratize” access to the 48% by offering the opportunities through the Uganda Securities Exchange.

A model to turn that equity into shares that can be acquired by ordinary Ugandans is the best way forward. Companies intending to acquire Ugandan shareholding in order to qualify under article 125  should be compelled to fulfil that obligation through a listing on the stock exchange. This should give proper meaning to national ownership, indigenization and local content. That’s my considered view

This debate on the 48% mirrors another “resource sharing” one in the downstream or revenue sharing bill which is part of the omnibus proposed Public Finance Bill (PFB). Within the bill are proposals for the sharing of revenues between the central government and local ones- including cultural institutions.

The exact criteria for apportioning revenues has like the 48% not been fully debated and it aught to if of course one can get to it within the fog of confrontations between the state and the media currently underway.

Review: Chatham House: Oil in Uganda. International Lessons for Success.

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Guest Writers

WRITTEN BY ANGELO IZAMA

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Tucked away in one of the tallest buildings in Kampala is the oddly named ‘National Social Security Fund.’ Oddly named because despite its intention to provide a soft landing for salaried employees, NSSF is hardly a pension fund.

Most Ugandans in fact consider its deductions a form of taxation. Recently the NSSF managing director, the former banking official Richard Byarugaba, described the fund, now easily Uganda’s wealthiest purse beside the Central bank, as a “monster.”

What he meant was that despite its lion size, the fund is little more than a pussycat in the economy, meowing, not roaring, scratching and not clawing forward at the opportunities around it. Around the world these days it is fashionable to talk of Africa’s moment. On Sandhill road in the small but extra-wealthy city of Palo Alto where Silicon Valley investors eager for the next big find pitch their ventures, Africa is coming up regularly.

These venture funds chasing things like technology, and increasingly Africa’s natural resources, are not larger than two or three hundred million dollars on average. So it’s not just a case of a little African irony that NSSF, with all its financial muscle, can hardly invest in an economy courted by smaller funds elsewhere.

That is, an economy with oil. To get a full picture of the scale of this irony, consider this. At Shs 3.1 trillion, NSSF represents a value almost five per cent of the Gross Domestic Product. The fund grows at Shs 80bn every month, according to Byarugaba. Its liquidity accounts for 50 per cent of the value of government treasury bills as well as 60 per cent of the float on the Uganda Securities Exchange.

NSSF has another problem. All its investments are safe investments protected by unique “corporate governance” signatures. Bonds, shares or treasury bills are low risk investments.

Several blocks away, one of its high-risk ventures, an ultra modern office block, however, is literary stuck in the mud. The fund pays Shs 50m to maintain the grounds of what should have been a Shs 250bn NSSF Towers. Just Shs 50bn was spent before the project got stuck in the sort of controversies that delay major public projects in Uganda.

When this writer suggested NSSF look to the new and exciting opportunities in Uganda’s emerging oil sector, Byarugaba was unimpressed. One can see why. Tomorrow a paper published by Britain’s leading Think Tank, Chatham House, will list out some basic dos and don’ts to “avoid the resource curse.”  Titled ‘Oil in Uganda. International Lessons for Success’, the paper was commissioned by the Open Society Initiative for Uganda.

Like many expert works, Ben Shepherd, its author, has provided various recommendations that will confront the spider web of how development actually works in a country like Uganda or indeed elsewhere in Africa. One of its assumptions is, for example, that an agreement exists on how to do progress or even what progress looks and feels like.

The paper distills practical lessons into a miracle potion of essentials to guard against the resource curse broadly around four pillars, a widely shared commitment to stability and growth, a capable bureaucracy, an engaged public and agreement on spending priorities with oil money.

It is important in this constellation to lift the meaning of an agreement on what constitutes progress to various actors in Uganda’s oil story. This is perhaps why consensus leads Shepherd’s recommendations and spreads through his analysis. A shared commitment to stability and growth is difficult to nail down. If it were successful it would paint a picture closer to Norway, the leading role model for successfully-managed oil resources.

Most experts, including Ugandan trained ones, on the Norwegian case admit that its highly evolved democracy, efficient and committed bureaucracy and an economy already accustomed to managing large national projects were behind its success as an oil producer.

Uganda, by contrast, is a donor Frankenstein that has found oil. The country, long a laboratory of ‘international best practices’, went from an aid-donor darling, a poster child of successful post-war recovery, to the unwanted cousin of the development story, its growth apparently arrested by an overdose of donor-driven policies, too little government and too much politics.

The country’s distended public sector, its raucous political classes and distressed civil service, ravaged by an epidemic of corruption are seen by most ‘experts’ as rooted in one problem: some form of bad government. Confidence in public institutions has been ebbing away steadily.

The debate over the role of the army over the last few weeks shows starkly how institutions of political agreement are in constant flux. There is hardly one national project, including roads, dams or even a national identity project that has been completed on schedule and within budget. The biggest national project today, the Karuma dam, has stalled amid allegations of corruption and mismanagement of the contractual process.

Its predecessor, Bujagali, took over a decade to build. Even if the civil works for that project cost $400m, the cost of capital in this environment put the final bill at $900m, over twice its original budget. Karuma is projected to be the most expensive dam of its size in history as well.

My own thesis is that Uganda’s quagmire is the result of institutional stresses it is facing from a double transition. One transition is a political one. The other is a transition into an oil producer. For oil to work in the way a priest hopes the Sunday sermon does to purge sinners of their life of sin, basing on expert advice like the kind contained in the Chatham House report, a political bargain must be struck by Uganda’s contending classes.

This is the ultimate challenge of ensuring that the stress test on institutions arising from political uncertainty does not atrophy. It is possible that if such an agreement were secured through the existing institutions of democratic decision, then in 10 years when the oil sector matures, it will find a stable environment.

To this the paper rightly observes that unlike many countries that were thrown into the deep end of the resource trap, like Nigeria, Uganda has time on its side. S

hepherd does not just treat as vital the importance of agreement between the principal actors, the government, the opposition and civil society, he considers as equally, if not more important, the securing of a sort of widespread buy-in by the wider society, a form of social contract that in the case of oil revolves on how much Ugandans participate through informed conversation on the spending priorities of a government entrusted with massive oil revenues.

“A population that understands how revenues are being spent is more likely to work with the government rather than against it,” he writes.

Put differently, however, very rarely is a common vision of progress the basis of political consensus. And so on the eve of oil production, you have a workers’ savings fund like NSSF that cannot invest because of the turbulent politics imposes on wealth creation and a political class still sorting itself out.

The good news is that with oil revenues over a decade away, Ugandan decision makers have many opportunities to reflect on the risks of oil. These international lessons can still be well-learnt.

The author is a writer and journalist based in Kampala. He is a 2012-13 Open Society fellow.

Published in the Observer Monday February 4th.

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